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Abstract: 
What drives stated preferences about the number of foreigners? Is it self-interest as stressed by the political 
economy of immigration? Does social interaction affect this preference or is the immigration preference 
completely in line with the preference for the aggregate population size? In this paper we distinguish each of 
these categories and show for the case of the Netherlands that each of these elements applies although the effect 
of population size preference and the self-interest are the most important elements. There is a clear divide across 
educational levels as the lower educated are more against immigration than the highly educated. Experience with 
foreigners arising from social contact matters in positively appreciating immigrants, especially if one meets 
(non-western) foreigners at work and school. Contact with foreigners while going out decreases the preference 
for immigrants. The ethnic composition of the neighbourhood in which one lives does not exert a noticeable 
effect on the evaluation of the number of foreigners present. The biggest effect on immigration preferences is, 
however, the aggregate population size preference of respondents. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Immigration raises mixed emotions amongst politicians and the population at large. That is at 
least the impression that is raised by discussions on the pros and cons of immigration in 
Europe. On the one hand, views seem to be biased or outright xenophobic and some political 
parties earn a livelihood by catering to these feelings. Political parties taking explicit anti-
immigration positions have found significant support in France, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Denmark and eastern regions of Germany. On the other hand, some governments 
and international organisations advocate immigration as a way to solve the financial problems 
associated with ageing populations or stabilising the geopolitical balance of powers in the face 
of widely divergent population growth rates (cf. Demeny, 2003). 
Unfortunately the politics and economics of immigration cannot be split up in separate 
issues. The integration of immigrants in Western societies can stretch a number of generations 
as the work by Borjas (1999) demonstrates. Problems associated with integration and ethnic 
diversity are part and parcel of immigration flows and in that respect it becomes quite 
important to know how the population at large evaluates immigration flows. Why does 
immigration raise such mixed feelings? Is it simply a question of (economic) self- interest? 
The political economy of immigration (Borjas, 1995, Benhabib, 1996; Söllner, 1999, Krieger, 
2003) suggests that it is quite likely that feelings about immigrants are completely in line with 
self- interest and that people will vote accordingly about issues of immigration and integration. 
Immigration flows generally affect owners of factors of production asymmetrically and 
immigration supporters are to be found among those who expect to gain (skilled workers, 
pensioners, multinationals) and immigration protesters among those who expect to lose 
(unskilled workers and unions who represent them). In this paper we will take a closer look at 
the empirical validity of the political economy model of immigration and offer alternative and 
complementary explanations why immigration preferences may differ across citizens. 
Our hunch is that the political economy of immigration may overlook a number of 
issues that are tied to immigration. The first is related to the social psychological 
consequences of immigration. The reason why immigration raises such mixed feelings may 
well be the result of a lack of contact with foreigners, or perhaps even the reverse: intense 
contact with foreigners brings about (or reinforce) the anti- immigration pressure. Which way 
contact with foreigners will affect attitudes of natives is an unresolved question, but as 
numerous American studies (cf. Taylor, 1998) have shown it is a factor that should not be 
dismissed too easily from the issue of immigration. 
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The second neglected issue refers to the issue of population size preferences as the 
inflow of foreigners affects per definition the size and structure of the aggregate population. 
Immigration has become in the light of below replacement fertility a more important factor of 
population growth and instrument of government policy. 1 However, the extent to which 
immigration preferences are related to preferences about the total size of the population are 
underdeveloped. To what extent do people with concerns about a shrinking population have a 
more positive attitude toward immigration of foreigners? This is an important question since 
some regions in Europe (notably in Spain and East Germany) are confronted with decreasing 
population numbers, and the inflow of migrants is among the most discussed policy solution 
to prevent the evolution of 'ghost' towns and regions. However, the stand on immigration in 
relation to the population size preference could also go in the other direction as statements 
made by population pressure groups make clear. There are numerous political pressure groups 
in the international arena2 that try to establish zero or negative population growth in order to 
prevent a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). These population pressure groups are 
generally also negative about the consequences of immigration, not on account of potential 
ethnic conflict or racism but out of concern with the environment and spatial crowding. The 
Netherlands is no exception, where the so-called ‘Club of Ten Million’ – a pressure group and 
prospective national political party - advocates a population decrease as long as the Dutch 
population size is larger than the optimal population of ten million inhabitants. 
 In this paper we will take a closer look at the stated preferences of inhabitants about 
the number of immigrants. Of course, we are not the first to perform such a study and there 
are a number of studies that have examined the attitudes of national inhabitants towards 
immigrants.3 The novelty of this paper may well be the explicit inclusion of population size 
preferences. Besides including more conventional explanations for immigration preferences, 
like arguments related to the political economy of immigration and social interaction, the 
population size preference turns out to be essential for understanding stated immigration 
preferences. 
The data that we use in this paper refer exclusively to the Netherlands. The case of the 
Netherlands is interesting in its own right for a number of reasons. First of all, the Dutch have 
                                                                 
1 More so as most governments in Western Europe abstain from pro-natalistic policies. In fact, 8 of the 15 
European Union member states that were assessed by the United Nations (2002) considered the level of fertility 
'too low' but the large majority of governments is reluctant to advocate higher fertility rates (only Luxembourg 
and Austria are pro-natalistic). 
2  See for instance the program of the association for Negative Population Growth (www.npg.org/), or the Dutch 
Club of Ten Million (www.tienmiljoen.nl/Eng/index.htm). 
3 See, e.g., Bauer et al. (2000), Gang et al. (2002), and Boeri et al. (2002) and the literature cited in these studies. 
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come to realise that their country has become 'a nation of immigrants'. According to the latest 
statistics approximately 18 percent of the total population is of foreign origin (most broadly 
defined)4 and it would be of some interest to see whether the Dutch also employ the state of 
mind that belongs to a so-called nation of immigrants. Second, the Netherlands is one of the 
most crowded and urbanised nations in the world. The high population density would seem to 
make the Dutch sensitive to the issues of population size and structure. 
Finally, a third reason, the Dutch case may well be exemplary for other European 
nations. Most European countries have to get used to the status of immigration nation, the 
presence of non-western immigrants who do not seem to adapt or integrate, and the 
Netherlands is no exception. Furthermore, although each and every European country has its 
idiosyncratic political movements, the stellar rise of political anti- immigration movements can 
be seen across a number of European nations – Austria (with the Freedom Party and party 
leader Haider), France (with National Front and Le Pen), Belgium (Vlaams Blok with De 
Winter), Denmark (Danish People’s Party) and Italy (Northern League). The Netherlands is 
no exception to this unfortunate rule and the Dutch have witnessed the rise of a similar figure 
– Pim Fortuyn – whose political program was rather outspoken about closing borders and the 
forced integration of immigrants in the Netherlands. 
All in all, the Dutch present us with an interesting case study and this will be explored 
in the remainder of this paper. First, we will state in section 2 what possible reasons may be 
given for explaining immigration preferences. Secondly, we will test for the importance of the 
various forces (in section 3) that are behind the evaluation of the number of foreigners in 
practice. Finally, section 4 summarises and puts the estimation results in perspective. 
 
2. What’s Behind Stated Immigration Preferences? 
In explaining immigration preferences several research lines can be distinguished. First, 
common wisdom has it that people vote with their purse and these forces are frequently 
stressed by authors working in the domain of the political economy of immigration. The main 
driving force behind stating and expressing immigration preferences is economic self- interest 
(or group interest). Second, social interaction with foreigners becomes an important driving 
                                                                 
4 Statistics Netherlands uses as of January 1999 a new definition of immigrants. An immigrant used to be defined 
by the fact that he/she was born abroad and at least one of his parents was of foreign origin or if both parents are 
born abroad. As of 1999, someone is designated as an 'immigrant' if he or she has at least one parent who is born 
abroad, with the further distinction of first generation immigrants - those born abroad with at least one parent 
who is of foreign origin (i.e. born abroad) - and second generation immigrants - those born in the Netherlands 
with at least one parent born abroad. Half of the 3 million immigrants in the Netherlands in 2002 is first 
generation (1 million of non-western origin and 0.5 million of western origin). 
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force for the evaluation of immigration flows. Within social psychology it is generally 
assumed that people categorise the world on the basis of the social groups to which they 
belong and/or with which they identify themselves. Others are evaluated in terms of the 
degree to which they are similar and dissimilarity of outgroup members is evaluated 
negatively (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Third, evaluating immigration flows directly affects the 
population size of a country and in that respect one would expect population size preferences 
to be of some importance in evaluating immigration flows. These three strands in literature 
are briefly discussed below. 
 
Political economy of immigration 
The story of immigration preferences will inevitably revolve around the political economy of 
immigration as this particular strand in the public choice literature takes into account how 
interests of diverse population groups are affected by the inflow of immigrants. The position 
on the labour market – according to standard model of welfare economics of immigration5  – 
is important for understanding who stands to gain and loose from immigration flows. Worker 
types with a higher education profit from an inflow of unskilled labour, whereas the unskilled 
labour force is expected to be dead set against such an inflow as the immigrants are in most 
cases low-skilled workers who will compete with the low skilled incumbent work force. The 
subsequent drop in wage for low skilled and the rise in high skilled wages makes divergent 
opinions about immigration quite understandable. Of course, the attitudes toward immigrants 
by skill type will depend in the end on the skill composition of actual immigration flows. 
High skilled workers could very well be supporting anti- immigration measures if a country is 
‘flooded’ by high skilled immigrants. But given the stylised fact that the majority of 
immigrants are from outside the European Union and that these immigrants are distinctively 
less skilled than the average Dutch national worker, it can be expected that the skilled workers 
are significantly less averse to immigration than the low skilled Dutch workers. 
 However, immigrants do not only affect (perceived) outcomes on the labour market, they 
can potentially affect capital market asset returns. For a small open economy with more or 
less full capital mobility this possibility seems too farfetched to be true for financial assets. 
Nevertheless, one can imagine that immigration flows can affect asset prices that are set by 
local circumstances, like the housing market. Especially when negative externalities tied to 
ethnic concentration are present in a local housing market (c.q. neighbourhood) (cf. Saiz, 
2003) it is understandable that immigrants are viewed as a threat. It should be stressed that 
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home-ownership has increased significantly over the years in the Netherlands and 52 percent 
of the housing stock in 2000 was owner-occupied. Furthermore, as a consequence of soaring 
housing prices during the nineties, the capital value of houses has become an important part of 
the asset portfolio, besides pension rights and private savings. 
 A final element that might raise mixed feelings amongst native voters is the fiscal impact 
of immigration. The possibility of low-skilled immigration not only harms the employment 
opportunities of competing native workers, it can also affect the general population by the 
fiscal consequences of immigration. Generational accounting exercises for the Netherlands 
(Roodenburg et al., 2003) point out that immigrants offer by and large a net loss and given the 
strong progressive nature of income taxes, natives with a net wealth position may be just the 
ones who fear that extra redistribution will take place if immigration flows increase. The 
insight of Roodenburg et al. (2003) was also corroborated by other studies for European 
welfare states such as those calculations made for the German (Sinn and Werding, 2001) and  
the Swedish case (Storesletten, 2003). 
 
Social interaction theory 
Social interaction focuses on how non-market interaction of individuals affects social and 
economic decisions. Living amongst ethnic minorities and meeting people of different groups 
may affect choices in the public and private domain as individuals learn from such contacts 
and change their attitude about certain people or groups of people. The way in which ethnic 
concentration affects preferences may go either way. Ethnic concentration may create a 
perception of threat and alienation (a negative force), but it can also be a mechanism that 
offers possibilities for intergroup contact that might reduce unrealistic negative perceptions of 
one another (the ‘contact’ hypothesis). There is a large body of mainly American research (cf. 
Pettigrew, 1998, Taylor, 1998, Oliver and Wong, 2003 and studies cited there) in which 
ethnic concentration engenders negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The experience 
of living among ethnic minorities or having frequent contact with them may, however, also 
affect the opinions of people positively. Similarity attraction is the causal process alleged to 
underlie this contact hypothesis: consequences of contact are the discovery of similarity 
between groups. Hewstone and Brown (1986) show, however, that contact alone is often not 
enough and that several aspects of the contact such as frequency, quality, areas of contact, 
voluntary versus involuntary are also important. In short, it matters what type of contact the 
incumbent population has with foreigners. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Cf. Borjas (1995, 1999, 2003), Benhabib (1996), and Söllner (1999), Krieger (2003), Kemnitz (2003). 
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 With respect to the meeting places where respondents have contact with the outgroup (as 
in our case foreigners) we need to stress that not every contact situation has high 
‘acquaintance potential’ (i.e. it enables individuals to get to know each other as individuals, 
rather than as stereotypical outgroup members). In other words, in order to be confident about 
the salutary effect of having contact with foreigners one needs to vary the places and 
circumstances of contact. Some studies restrict attention to merely having contact with the 
outgroup but contact as such is often meaningless as the type of contact can vary from very 
superficial (meeting others in the street or in the bus) to a very intense contact, at school or at 
work. For instance, a well-known example is presented by Minard (1952) who discusses the 
case study of a mining community in West Virginia where black and white miners were 
willing to work side by side below the ground, but above the ground they went their separate 
ways. To account for this diversity of contacts and the effect on immigration preferences, we 
have used the different places of contact – at school, while going out, at work, and at sports 
clubs (see Hewstone and Brown, 1986). The effect of contact is a priori ambiguous as contact 
at the various meeting places can go in either direction. 
 
Population size preference 
In discerning the influence of population size preferences on preferences concerning the 
number of immigrants residing in a country one can consult the large body of insights 
provided by welfare economics. Of course, the main contribution of the welfare economics of 
population is to understand the ethics of population policies and related issues. But besides 
offering a ‘grammar’ for understanding the logic of population policy, the ethics of population 
may also be present in the minds of ordinary people.  
 In the welfare economics of population the shadow of the work of ‘worldly philosophers’ 
like Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Knut Wicksell and Thomas Malthus is still present in 
the minds and hearts of those who are concerned with population issues in the 20th and 21st 
century. Following the usage of Nerlove et al. (1987) we will divide the intellectual debate on 
population and welfare by the (implicit) social welfare criteria used by Bentham and Mill and 
their utilitarian followers. A welfare criterium is, of course, nothing more and nothing less 
than the measuring rod of judging morally correct courses of  action - in this case population 
policy - and as modern population debates prove the revealed positions on population policy 
are strongly influenced by one's ethical position: either one invokes the Benthamite welfare 
function – which stresses the greatest happiness for the greatest number – or a Millian welfare 
function that simply evaluates welfare in terms of the population average. In fact, depending 
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on which welfare criterion one supports, one can arrive at opposite policy conclusions in 
matters of population policy. People endorsing the Benthamite view will support maximising 
the number of people no matter how small the increment in welfare is. In its most extreme 
form this will lead under circumstances of fixed resources to what Parfit (1984) calls the 
‘repugnant conclusion’: a very low standard of living for a very large population. However, 
people endorsing the Millian welfare view will value a smaller population higher as it 
increases the average welfare, in the presence of some fixed resource. Clearly, the Millian 
welfare view is implicit in the (neo) Malthusian theory of population. 
 The same issues will return in matters of immigration as long as the social welfare 
function includes the welfare of immigrants and both immigrants and natives are ascribed the 
same utility function. Of course, immigration becomes a more complicated welfare exercise 
when immigrants are treated differently and indeed in most developed countries immigrants 
cannot count on the same treatment as nationals. Such an asymmetric treatment could imply 
that immigrants are valued for their productive contribution but they are not included 
(immediately) in matters of social welfare. In other words, the utility of immigrants is not 
valued at the same rate as that of natives.6 Whether a nation is inclusive or exclusive is quite 
essential when it comes down to evaluating immigration policies (see Quibria, 1990) and for 
this reason the evaluation of aggregate population growth may not coincide with the 
evaluation of immigration flows. 
 
Methods 
We will use data from a national representative survey that the Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute (NIDI) conducts at regular intervals among the Dutch population about 
their attitudes and opinions concerning demographic developments. We have used the latest 
wave, conducted in May 2002. As the opinions, attitudes and preferences of the voters are the 
focus of attention, only respondents with the Dutch nationality are included in this sample.7 
The data were collected by the databank CentERdata of the University of Tilburg (see for 
more details: centerdata.kub.nl) which maintains a representative Internet-based panel of two 
thousand households in the Netherlands. To correct for the possibility of two or more 
                                                                 
6 Another complication is introduced by the issue of international trade,, but as Quibria (1990) shows the general 
insights offered by Nerlove et al. (1987) for the case of a closed economy generally carry over to an integrated 
world economy. 
7 An alternative to this restriction is to include only those born in the Netherlands. Both definitions have their 
shortcomings as the nationality criterion may include former foreigners, and the place of birth criterion may also 
include foreigners as defined by Statistics Netherlands, viz. second-generation immigrants. For the estimation 
results these definitional questions do not matter as the estimation results do not change significantly. 
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respondents per household and their reciprocal influence in stating preferences we have 
adjusted the standard errors by requiring the observations to be independent across clusters, 
i.e. households.8 The survey data are, however, linked to the 2002 census information of 
Statistics Netherlands about the respondents’ neighbourhood. 
  The exact question around which this paper revolves is: “What is your opinion about the 
number of foreigners in the Netherlands?” The possible answer categories are: there are (1) 
too many foreigners; (2) neither too many, nor too few foreigners; and (3) too few foreigners. 
The question has a clear normative undertone as it forces respondents to evaluate the number 
of foreigners. By and large most of the Dutch think there are too many foreigners (60 
percent), 39 percent thinks there are neither too many nor too few foreigners and hardly 1 
percent thinks that are too few foreigners. Because the latter category is so small we will 
collapse the last two categories and restrict attention to those who think there are ‘too many’ 
foreigners and those who think otherwise.9 Estimation will be done by means of logit 
analysis. 
 The first three variables – age, number of children and religious denomination – are used 
as control variables. The age variable is introduced as each and every generation may have 
been formed by the era in which it grew up. The old generation, e.g., has enjoyed a youth in 
an ‘all white’-society, contrary to the young who are more acquainted with the pros and cons 
of a multicultural society. The number of children is added as a control variable as a larger 
group of ethnic minorities may increase the chance that one of the children of the respondent 
will mix and or perhaps form relationships with the children of other ‘outgroups’. By 
including this variable one can approximate the respondent’s revealed preference for 
interracial mixing. Finally, the religion of the respondent may be an important control variable 
as population and immigration policies are to some extent affected by the religious beliefs of 
respondents, or the values that are instilled on the members of a religion. Furthermore, 
immigration can also be perceived as a threat to the viability of the ‘ingroup’ by its members 
and hence immigration eva luations may be coloured by such perceptions. 
 The other variables fall into the three general categories: political-economic variables, 
social interaction variables and last but not least, population size variables. In testing for the 
various hypotheses we will use the following explanatory variables: 
 
                                                                 
8 Although this is a necessary step to rule out the possibility of dependence of outcomes, the subsequent 
estimation results hardly differ from the model in which standard errors are not adjusted. 
9 Keeping the three outcomes to the survey question separately and analysing the categorical ordering by means 
of ordered logit analysis does not change the above conclusions in any way.  
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Demographic variables 
· Age of the respondent in question. To check for non-linearities or age group-specific 
effects we have used four age groups in the estimation process: those whose age is (1) 
16-29 years; (2) 30-44 years; (3) 45-64 years; and (4) 65 years and older. 
· The number of children in the household of the respondent. 
· Religious denomination is the self- reported membership of a religion to which the 
respondent says he or she belongs, with the following categories: (1) no membership; 
(2) Catholic church; (3) Dutch reformed church; (4) Dutch orthodox reformed church; 
(5) Other Christian religions (evangelical churches, Jehovah’s witnesses, other 
Christian churches); (6) Small non-Christian religious groups (Jewish, Islam, no stated 
religious membership). 
 
Political economy variables 
· The (attained) level of education of respondents, and here each respondent can mark 
his or her (highest) level of education: (1) primary school or lower; (2) high school 
(lower level); (3) high school (higher level); (4) vocational training; (5) university. 
· The net wealth position of the household, that is, the value of private assets minus the 
level of outstanding debts of the household. Respondents did not have to sum up the ir 
wealth position exactly, they could indicate which of the seven wealth intervals 
described their total wealth (current value of their own house, savings, stocks, etc. 
minus the value of debts and mortgages) position accurately. For the present study we 
collapsed the seven intervals into four categories: (1) € 25.000 or less (base category);  
(2) € 25.000- € 100.000; (3) € 100.000- € 225.000; and (4) € 225.000 or more. 
 
Social interaction variables 
· The aggregate population density of the neighbourhood in which one lives, split up 
into four categories with the urban category as the base category. The neighbourhood 
is approximated by area circumscribed by the postal code level, which gives quite 
detailed information on neighbourhood characteristics such as the number of persons 
and households, the ethnic composition, the average level of income (as can be found 
on www.statline.nl). To arrive at the population density, we have divided the total 
number of persons living in a postal code area by the exact surface (in square 
kilometers; as given by Geodan IT, see http://www.geodan.nl/uk/). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Evaluation number of foreigners Mean Standard deviation 
   Too many foreigners 0.592 0.49 
   Not too many foreigners 0.408 0.49 
Age category: 16-29 years 0.137 0.34 
   30-44 years 0.349 0.48 
   45-64 years 0.374 0.48 
   65+ years 0.140 0.35 
Number of children 1.577 1.38 
Religious denomination:  None 0.541 0.50 
   Catholic 0.231 0.42 
   Dutch reformed 0.104 0.30 
   Orthodox reformed 0.079 0.27 
    Other Christian religions 0.025 0.16 
    Non-Christian religious groups (Jews, Islam, etc.) 0.020 0.14 
Education achieved: Low education 0.294 0.46 
   High school (lower level) 0.212 0.41 
   High school (higher level) 0.137 0.34 
   Vocational training 0.246 0.43 
   University 0.111 0.31 
Net wealtha: Less than € 25.000 0.324 0.47 
   € 25.000- € 100.000 0.221 0.42 
   € 100.000 - € 225.000 0.267 0.44 
   More than € 225.000 0.187 0.39 
Population density neighbourhood: more than  4.54 (in thousands) 0.243 0.43 
   1.87 - 4.54 inhabitants per km2  0.257 0.44 
   0.50 - 1.87 inhabitants per km2 0.249 0.43 
   Smaller than 0.50 inhabitants per km2 0.251 0.43 
Ethnic composition neighbourhood 0.083 0.10 
Contact with foreigners: At school 0.214 0.41 
   At work 0.538 0.50 
   When going out 0.164 0.37 
   At clubs (sports and other) 0.220 0.41 
Population size evaluation: Should decrease 0.301 0.46 
   Should remain constant 0.615 0.49 
   Should increase 0.085 0.28 
Valid sample N = 1726  
(a) Value of the assets (housing, financial assets) minus the value of private debts (mortgages, loans). 
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· The ethnic concentration in the neighbourhood as measured by the percentage of non-
western foreigners living in the neighbourhood. 
· The place of contact where respondents meet (non-western) foreigners of various 
ethnic groups. In the survey respondents were asked about whether they meet non-
western foreigners and if so where. In the survey a number of places were asked 
(where the respondent with no contact at all with non-western foreigners served as the 
base category): (1) at school; (2) at work; (3) while going out (e.g. in a disco or a pub); 
and (4) at society clubs or sports clubs. 
 
Population size preference 
· Population size preference as measured by the answers to the question “Should the 
number of inhabitants of the Netherlands in the future: (1) decrease; (2) remain the 
same; or (3) increase. 
 
The summary statistics of the various groups of explanatory variables stated above are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
3. Putting the forces to the test 
In the previous discussion of factors affecting stated preferences about immigration we have 
introduced three groups of factors based on the insights from the political economy of 
immigration, social psychology and the welfare economics of population policy. Three 
models have been estimated to explain the immigration preferences of the Dutch population. 
The first model includes (besides the individual level control variables) the political-economic 
characteristics such as education and wealth. The second model includes additional variables 
concerning social interaction with immigrants. The third model encompasses not only these 
two elements but also the evaluation of the population size by the respondents. The estimation 
results for the three separate models are presented in Table 2. 
The last column of Table 2 shows that each of the three cited forces seems to be of 
some relevance in explaining immigration preferences. It is not just economic self- interest or 
social contact or population size preferences that can explain immigration preferences, but it 
is clearly a result of all three forces. We will elaborate on these results below. 
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Table 2: Explaining immigration preferencesa (logit analysis) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Age category (16-29 years =0)       
   30-44 years 0.29 1.61 0.18 0.99 0.25 1.32 
   45-64 years 0.29 1.57 0.24 1.27 0.26 1.27 
   65+ years -0.21 0.86 -0.13 0.50 -0.04 0.16 
Number of children -0.06 1.26 -0.06 1.24 -0.11* 2.06 
Religious denomination (none=0)       
    Catholic -0.36* 2.47 -0.33* 2.25 -0.44** 2.75 
    Dutch reformed -0.41* 2.06 -0.37 1.82 -0.40 1.86 
    Orthodox reformed 0.07 0.33 0.09 0.41 -0.09 0.39 
    Other Christian religions 0.54 1.38 0.71* 1.81 0.43 1.11 
    Non-Christian  religious groups 0.91* 2.26 0.96* 2.39 1.07** 2.74 
Education achieved (low education = 0)       
   High school (lower level) 0.52** 3.37 0.50** 3.15 0.46** 2.79 
   High school (higher level) 0.90** 5.20 0.84** 4.72 0.83** 4.36 
   Vocational training 1.39** 9.16 1.32** 8.52 1.37** 8.54 
   University 1.64** 8.43 1.51** 7.60 1.50** 7.23 
Net wealth (less than € 25.000 = 0)       
   € 25.000- € 100.000 -0.41** 2.60 -0.40** 2.51 -0.44** 2.69 
   € 100.000 - € 225.000 -0.36* 2.37 -0.33* 2.10 -0.41* 2.55 
   More than € 225.000 -0.57** 3.21 -0.50** 2.70 -0.47* 2.47 
Population density neighbourhood  (> 4.54 = 0)       
   1.87 – 4.54 inhabitants per km2  - - -0.17 1.01 -0.20 1.12 
   0.50 - 1.87 inhabitants per km2 - - -0.26 1.42 -0.21 1.07 
   Smaller than 0.50 inhabitants per km2 - - -0.63** 3.14 -0.66** 3.12 
Ethnic concentration  neighbourhood - - -0.15 0.21 0.09 0.13 
Contact with foreigners (no contact = 0)       
   At school - - 0.33* 2.34 0.40** 2.75 
   At work - -  0.30* 2.47 0.36* 2.48 
   When going out - - -0.33* 2.10 -0.36* 2.12 
   At clubs (sports and other) - - -0.10 0.80 -0.11 0.82 
Population size evaluation (decrease=0)       
   Should remain constant - - - - 1.35** 9.41 
   Should increase - - - - 2.07** 8.93 
Constant -0.88** 4.99 -0.71** 2.77 -1.70** 5.75 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.10 0.16 
c2(df) 152.7 171.7 257.3 
Loglikelihood -1069.0 -1052.2 -979.0 
(a) Note: N = 1726; the symbol ** denotes significance at the 1 % level and the symbol * at the 5% level. T-values refer to 
absolute t-values. All coefficients are adjusted with Huber-White correction. 
 
 
 
 13 
Political economy of immigration 
The political economy argument is clearly reflected in the estimation coefficients as the 
evaluation of the number of foreigners is positively correlated with the level of education of 
respondents. To get an impression from some bivariate (weighted) statistics: 76 percent of the 
respondents with a low level of education judges the level of foreigners too high. The higher 
educated are least worried about the number of foreigners as 39 percent thinks there are too 
many and the remaining 61 percent thinks that there are neither too many nor too few. The 
almost linear increasing pattern of coefficients with respect to education is in line with 
standard welfare theoretical analysis of immigration shocks, as set out by Borjas (1995). 
The wealth variable clearly shows that people with a net wealth position are not 
enthused about foreigners. However, the difference across wealth categories is not that large 
as one can deduce from the coefficients in Table 2: for the three largest wealth categories the 
coefficients are more or less the same. In that respect one could argue that the presence of  
immigrants divides the 'haves' and 'have nots', where the ‘haves’ are more negative about the 
number of foreigners. 
 
Social interaction arguments 
The population density character of the neighbourhood in which respondents live is not as 
important as one is bound to deduce from popular policy debates: the linear relationship 
between population density and the intensity of negative attitudes towards foreigners cannot 
be found, as one can deduce from the insignificant coefficients in Table 2. The people who 
are living in urban surroundings are used as the base category and as one can see, there is 
hardly a difference between respondents who live in different crowded neighbourhoods. This 
finding is somewhat of a surprise as anti- immigration supporters (like the party of Pim 
Fortuyn) are generally found in large cities where ethnic minorities are concentrated and often 
segregated. Ethnic minorities, like Turks and Moroccans, are concentrated in cities like 
Rotterdam, The Hague and Amsterdam and the concentration has remained quite stable over 
the years (Bolt et al., 2002). The only effect that one can detect from population density is 
quite the reverse from what one would expect: anti- immigration sentiments among the 
respondents are stronger among those who live in localities with low population densities. In a 
way this may be the result of the effect that people who live in crowded, urban areas are better 
adapted to living with newcomers, contrary to people living in smaller towns and villages 
where newcomers and immigrants are more easily spotted and perhaps seen as a sign that 'the 
good old times' will never return. The second neighbourhood characteristic – the ethnic 
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concentration in the neighbourhood - is of no significant importance. The absence of an effect 
of ethnic concentration is puzzling as numerous other studies, primarily based on US data, 
show quite strong effects. The reason why such effects may well appear in other data sets can 
perhaps be traced to the type of data sets used. A large number of studies focus on attitudes in 
large metropolitan areas where ethnic concentration is high and of an ent irely different level 
than can be found in most European cities and certainly not at the level of a national 
representative survey that is used in the present study. 
In addition to the neighbourhood variables we have used explicit contact variables to 
test for the so-called ‘contact hypothesis’: the hypothesis that attitudes of the ingroup 
members change as a consequence of contact with outgroup members. The contact variables 
measure the contact that the incumbent population has with (non-western) foreigners at 
various places in society. To limit selectivity bias (see Pettigrew, 1998) in these settings we 
have excluded meeting places where respondents have a clear choice in meeting foreigners, as 
in home, and restricted our attention to cases where the choice is to some extent 
circumscribed. Meeting foreigners at work and at school are important measures of 
integration and as the estimation results in Table 2 show: work and school contacts affect 
evaluations positively. In other words, school and work are important mechanisms for making 
integration of (non-western) foreigners possible. Of course, common wisdom has it that 
school and work are important for the integration of foreigners because it increases their 
human capital. The estimation results suggest not only that work and school increase their 
social capital, the results suggest also that this type of social capital has the characteristics of a 
‘public good’ as it can generate large positive (or negative) externalities as a favourable (bad) 
contact not only makes the immigrant better (worse) off, the effect transcends the personal 
level of the contact and makes the entire outgroup better (worse) off.  
Although contact at work and school favourably improves the image of foreigners, 
contact with foreigners while going out at night affects the attitude towards foreigners 
negatively. The contact with foreigners while going out is perhaps more justly described as 
contact in the public domain, which probably will not always result in actual contact as one 
will encounter in contact in the private domains of work or school. In that respect, contact 
may in this particular case be an approximation of a threat, which apparently discredits the 
image of foreigners. 
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Population size preference 
Last but certainly not the least, we have assessed in model III the significance that population 
size preferences may add to the above set of variables. To test for this effect we have included 
the aggregate population size evaluation variable in our statistical analysis. As can be clearly 
seen by the two coefficients at the bottom of Table 2 (model III), the evaluation of the number 
of foreigners is greatly affected by the respondent’s population size preference. The 
explanatory power of the model is greatly improved by including the population size variable. 
One might expect that the population size variable is not entirely independent from the 
evaluation of the number of foreigners. There are, however, two telltale signs that suggest 
otherwise. First of all, the correlation between these two variables is remarkably low (r = 
0.27).10 A second telltale sign is the fact that the coefficients do not change substantially when 
switching from model II to model III. 
 
Demographics 
Finally, we end with examining the demographics of respondents. It is noteworthy that age is 
of no importance in evaluating the number of foreigners as, e.g., pensioners are the ones who 
share a life-course history in which non-western immigrants (save those from the Dutch 
colonies) were hardly present. Religion and the number of children are, contrary to age, of 
some importance. Apparently, having children reveals that respondents are either against 
interracial mixing or afraid of the consequences of a multicultural society for the future of 
their children. The effect of religion is, however, the most interesting of the three control 
variables. The larger religious groups in the Netherlands – the Catholics and the Dutch and 
orthodox reformed members - are more set against immigration than the base category: the 
Dutch with no ties to a religion. This stance is in stark contrast to members of the smaller non-
Christian religious groups who are more in favour of immigrants. The contrast between these 
two religious groups is some extent understandable as the traditional Christian groups perhaps 
perceive immigrants as a threat, whereas the non-Christian groups (like Jews and Muslim) 
perceive existing immigration flows not as a threat but as a strengthening of the existing 
religious group. 
 
4. Conclusions  
European countries are struggling with relatively large inflows of immigrants. The acceptance 
of foreigners is a process that seems to give rise to large anti- immigration groups in countries 
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that used to be quite liberal. The Netherlands is no exception to this rule. In forming their 
opinion about the number of foreigners most of the Dutch respondents (60 percent) claim that 
there are too many foreigners. The standard political economy of immigration (cf. Söllner, 
1999) would suggest that labour market position is the dominant force in voting on 
immigration issues. However, the reason why the majority of Dutch think that there are too 
many foreigners can be explained by a number of forces besides the labour market position. 
In order to unravel the preferences for the number of foreigners we studied the importance of 
three forces: (1) self- interest, revealed by positions on the labour market and capital market; 
(2) social contact with foreigners; and (3) a population size preference. 
Each of the three forces is of relevance in exp laining immigration preferences, and 
judging from the magnitude of effects the labour market position of inhabitants in conjunction 
with the population size preference dominate outcomes. Most studies about the consequences 
of immigration for western economies take the political economy of immigration as the 
standard model (see for overview Drinkwater et al. 2002) and indeed this model makes the 
prediction that incumbents are affected differently by their labour market and capital market 
status. Depicting winners and losers on the labour market from immigration is a relatively 
easy exercise and the results from our analysis suggest that welfare theoretical exercises (cf. 
Borjas, 1995, 2003) are not far off the mark. However, the consequences from the capital 
market position are less clear and our estimates suggest that the negative externalities of 
immigration could be more important than the straightforward capital market consequences, 
although this negative wealth effect could also be explained by future fiscal claims that result 
as a consequence of the inflow of foreigners, who seem to involve a considerable net present 
value loss to European welfare states (cf. Storesletten, 2003, and Roodenburg et al., 2003). 
Additional insight on the driving forces behind immigration preferences of the 
incumbent population is derived from social interaction and population size preferences that 
people share. Both are elements that are not often encountered in public choice literature but 
that do seem relevant. Contact with (non-western) foreigners can improve attitudes, especially 
if the incumbent population has contact with foreigners at work or at school. Contact with 
foreigners while going out affects the evaluation negatively. The novel element in our 
empirical analysis is to connect the issue of immigration preferences to that of the preferences 
concerning population size. It stands to reason that immigration policy views are influenced 
by population size preferences as net immigration affects population size per definition. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The full correlation matrix can be obtained upon request from the authors. 
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Hence, in unravelling the forces behind immigration preferences one cannot do – in a world 
with common goods and scarce space - without population size preferences.  
These results have rather strong implications for the economic analysis of migration as 
it would seem like a natural step to extend the political economy of immigration by using 
models of social interaction and diffusion (see Durlauf, 1999) and by paying close attention to 
the evolution of social norms, in particular about issues of popula tion size. The bottom line of 
this paper would seem to be that the political economy of immigration is a highly relevant 
tool of analysis but that it is only captures part of the truth. In order to sketch a richer map of 
integration models should also include elements of social interaction - whereby preferences of 
incumbents change during the process of interaction - as well as a preference of the native 
population for the aggregate population size. 
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